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Abstract
We deploy a socio-spatial approach and use a spatially representative survey that we conducted
in Hyderabad and Mumbai to analyze the relation between city space and religion. After
documenting the relative status of religious groups in urban India and different types of cities
using secondary databases, we identify poor-ghettos and elite-enclaves in Hyderabad and
Mumbai. In both cities, ghettos have a high proportion of Muslims, while enclaves are
dominated by non-Muslim inhabitants. Ghettoization of Muslims is far more pronounced in
Hyderabad than in Mumbai. A key finding on the relation between city space and religion is
that compared to segregated neighborhoods, mixed (“grayer”) neighborhoods produce better
economic outcomes like lower poverty. We argue that while Indian cities are becoming less
integrated along religious lines over the last 3-4 decades, this process is far from complete, and
needs to be reversed.
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The only alternative to coexistence is co-destruction.
- Jawaharlal Nehru.
1. Introduction
Many observers of India feel that the country is facing an unprecedented identity crisis
today.1 After repeated onslaughts from Hindu nationalism, the secular fabric of India seems to be
on the verge of tearing apart. This is a moment for analysis of the deeper roots of this crisis and
on ways in which India can move forward to ensure equity and religious tolerance. To enable
such an analysis, it is necessary to have a coherent picture of the status of religious groups in
India and the concrete conditions under which they live and co-exist. This paper attempts to
contribute to such an understanding by focusing on urban India and by analyzing the intersection
between space and religion in Indian cities.
Why focus on urban India? The rapid growth that India has been witnessing in recent
decades has been driven by the urban process, even as urban areas are being transformed by
growth.2 A visible change that has occurred in the urban landscape is a sharp increase in
inequality. In fact, urban inequality has been the main driver of overall Indian inequality
(Vakulabharanam and Motiram 2019). However, several aspects of ‘horizontal inequality’
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Several prominent public intellectuals have expressed such views in the media and through petitions in

the wake of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the arrests of peaceful protestors and activists.
See e.g., Ramachandra Guha (quoted in Povanna (2020)) and Mehta (2020).
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See Vakulabharanam and Motiram (2012), which presents relevant statistical details. On India’s growth,

recent slowdown and the debate over revised method of estimation, see Nagaraj (2013; 2020) and the
references therein.

(among groups) in urban India are underexplored.3 This is particularly the case for religious
groups e.g., while the intersection between religion and class has been commented upon,4
relatively less attention has been given to interconnections between religion and space
(particularly intra-city) due to the inadequacies of publicly available data (see Section 2). For
instance, the National Sample Survey (NSS) databases on consumption expenditure and
employment/unemployment lack information on intra-city spatial units. The decennial Census, a
database used to understand intra-city units (like Census wards) presents information on religion
only at the district level.
One of the contributions of this paper is to address the above gap. We do so using data
from publicly available secondary statistical databases and a primary household survey that we
designed and conducted in Hyderabad and Mumbai. This survey (described in Section 2)
overcomes the abovementioned limitations of secondary statistical databases. We document (in
Section 3) the status of religious groups in urban India by drawing on secondary databases.
Broadly speaking, this analysis confirms the presence of considerable differences among
religious groups, with Dalits (Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Scheduled Castes (SC)) and Muslims
occupying a relatively poor status. Some lesser-known findings also emerge e.g., regarding years
of education (available only recently) and wealth; similarities/differences within the urban sector
(among metros, million-plus cities and smaller cities/towns). This can be understood as an
analysis of large urban spaces/aggregations e.g., national or metropolitan. To analyze intra-city
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On ‘vertical’ (interpersonal) and ‘horizontal’ inequalities and the importance of the latter, see Stewart

(2002).
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After the report of the committee chaired by Justice Rajendra Sachar (GOI 2006) was made public,

concern has been expressed about the underrepresentation of Muslims in formal sector jobs.

space, we use the primary survey from Hyderabad and Mumbai, and deploy a ‘socio-spatial’
approach. In this approach, space is produced through socioeconomic processes, and space and
social relations influence each other (Soja 1980). We divide Hyderabad and Mumbai (in Section
4) into spatial zones based on their historical evolution and document how the status of religious
groups differs within and across these cities. We also identify ghettos and elite enclaves. Since
the publication of the Sachar committee report and the seminal work of Gayer and Jaffrelot
(2012), there has been considerable scholarly interest in the condition of Muslims in Indian
cities. The Sachar committee highlighted higher urbanization among Muslims (GOI 2006, p. 35)
and argued that they are being ghettoized.5 Studies from different cities (Gayer and Jaffrelot
2012; Susewind 2017) provide a more nuanced picture: while Muslims are in general
marginalized, their relative condition differs across cities/types of cities. Our findings
complement these e.g., we show that Muslims are ghettoized to a greater extent in Hyderabad as
compared to Mumbai. But, we also provide more detailed intra-city pictures of Hyderabad and
Mumbai e.g., Contractor’s (2012) insights are based on just one neighborhood (Shivaji Nagar) of
Mumbai. More importantly, we statistically establish the economic benefits of spatial integration
on religious lines.
In development discourse, certain goods (e.g., education) are valued both for their
intrinsic worth and for instrumental purposes (Sen 1999). Analogously, religious spatial coexistence can make cities more vibrant and enrich human lived-experience. But, can it also lead
to better economic/development outcomes? We establish that this is indeed the case. We term
spatial co-existence of groups (religious or non-religious ones like classes) as grayness, and
5

“Fearing for their security, Muslims are increasingly resorting to living in ghettos across the country.

This is more pronounced in communally sensitive towns and cities.” (GOI 2006, p. 14).

using an instrumental variable probit regression, show that households living in more mixedreligious neighborhoods are less likely to be poor. We provide some mechanisms (like dependent
informality) through which integration translates into better outcomes and discuss policies (e.g.,
stricter anti-discrimination regulation, reversing segregation) that flow from our findings.
2. Data and Methodology
We rely on two sources of data: public secondary databases and a household survey that
we conducted in Hyderabad and Mumbai. The databases that we use are: latest Periodic Labor
Force Survey (PLFS2, 2018-19) for earnings and consumption, latest All-India Debt and
Investment Survey (AIDIS, 2013) for wealth and 68th round (2011-12) of National Sample
Survey for consumption (since the 2017-18 survey was not made public). By treating them as
separate strata, AIDIS and 68th round provide reliable estimates for million-plus cities (larger
than a million). Using these surveys, we separately analyze the urban sector, million-plus cities
and four metros (Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai, which are million-plus). Unlike the
above databases, the decennial Census contains some intra-city information e.g., population,
literacy and work profile for Census wards. For Enumeration Blocks (EBs), only the population
of SCs, STs and Others is available. However, there are three major limitations: religious
composition is available only at the district level or higher (i.e., large aggregations), no data on
Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and limited scope for household-level analysis.
To overcome the limitations of secondary databases, we designed and conducted a
spatially representative household survey in Hyderabad and Mumbai during 2015-17. We
followed a multi-stage stratified sampling design where the strata are subdistricts in Hyderabad
and municipal wards in Mumbai. We selected 100 EBs and 1000 households in each city (10

households per EB) and administered a detailed schedule.6 We collected information on
important variables like demographic characteristics, nature of work, educational attainment and
income. Most importantly, information on religious and caste composition of intra-city spatial
units (like census wards and EBs) is available. More details are provided in section 4.
Using secondary data, we consider the following religious groups: Hindus, Muslims,
Christians and Other minorities (Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Zoroastrians and others). Using our
survey, since other minorities occupy small shares in both cities, we consider: Hindus, Muslims
and Others. It is inappropriate to ignore caste, so we divide Hindus into: Dalits (SC and ST),
OBCs and Others (so-called upper castes), and Muslims into: so-called Lower Castes (Dalit and
OBC) and Others.
In the interests of space, we will not go into debates on terminology (e.g., Peach 2009;
Galonnier 2015; Susewind 2017) and use the terms ghetto and enclave. These will be defined
below, but ghetto is a space marked by poverty where a marginalized group (e.g., Muslims or
Dalits) has a sizeable presence and enclave is a relatively rich space.
Having described the sources of data and methodology, we now move to the analysis.
3. An Overview of the Status of Religious Groups from Secondary Data
In this section, using secondary databases, we summarize the relative status of religious
groups in urban India on both monetary (income/earnings, consumption expenditure and wealth)
and non-monetary (education) dimensions.
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We were able to obtain data from 980 households (10 each in 98 EBs) in Mumbai and for 1000

households in Hyderabad. The survey data and relevant information will be made publicly available in
due course of time.

We start with earnings (see table 1). For ease of exposition, we make inferences based on
average earnings across all quarters.7 In urban areas, for both male and female regular-salaried
workers, Other Hindus and Christians are at the top. For self-employed workers, Other Hindus
and Other religious minorities have the highest average earnings. The performance of Christians
and other religious minorities has to been seen in light of their small share (this is also valid for
inferences below). Muslims (lower or upper caste) are at the bottom, except in the case of
regular-salaried females, where Dalits fare the worst. For all groups and both types of workers,
on the average, men receive higher incomes. The ranking among Hindu caste groups is as
expected for both men and women: Dalit, OBC, and Other Hindus, in increasing order of average
earnings. Lower caste Muslims perform worse on the average compared to their upper-caste
counterparts, except for female self-employed workers. The rural patterns are somewhat different
from urban ones e.g., the top two groups among self-employed female workers are Other Hindus
and Christians in rural areas, whereas they are Other Hindus and Other religious minorities in
urban areas.
Insert table 1 here
Moving to consumption expenditure, we present averages in table 2.8 Estimates from
PLFS2 show that in urban areas, the worst performing group is Dalits, closely followed by
lower-caste Muslims. The best performing group is Other religious groups with Other Hindus
following behind. On the average, Other Hindus have a consumption expenditure of about one
and half times as much as Dalits. The ranking of groups from the 68th round is different
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The survey allows us to derive estimates for each of the four quarters of the year.
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For 68th round, we present Uniform Recall Period (URP) estimates, but Mixed (MRP) and Modified

Mixed Recall Period (MMRP) estimates reveal a similar picture.

compared to that from PLFS2. The best and worst performing groups are Other Hindus and
lower caste Muslims, respectively. The former has an average consumption expenditure that is
about twice as much as the latter. Disaggregating the urban, million-plus cities and metros
display some differences from the urban sector. In particular, Christians and Other Hindus are at
the top in million-plus cities and metros, respectively. Lower caste Muslims are however at the
bottom in all urban spaces. The relative status of lower caste Muslims vis-à-vis Other Hindus is
the worst in million-plus cities – the former consumes less than 40% (38.4%) of the latter – the
corresponding figures for metros and the entire urban sector are about 44% and about 49%,
respectively. With both PLFS2 and the 68th round, rural patterns are somewhat different from
urban ones: lower caste Muslims fare better than their upper caste counterparts.
Insert table 2 here
Wealth can be conceptualized in terms of assets or net worth (assets-liabilities) (Jayadev
et al. 2007). We use the latter and consider per-capita net worth: net worth of a household
divided by its size. Estimates for the urban sector (table 3) indicate that Other religious
minorities possess the highest average wealth, followed by Other Hindus. Lower caste Muslims
are at the bottom of the hierarchy, just below Dalits. One noteworthy observation from urban
disaggregation is that in metros, lower caste Muslims are wealthier than their upper caste
counterparts. The rural wealth patterns are somewhat different from urban ones. In the rural
sector, Dalits are the poorest. Lower caste Muslims fare better than upper caste Muslims,
whereas Hindu groups fare as expected: Dalits, OBCs and Other Hindus in increasing order.
Insert table 3 here
PLFS2 contains data on years of education (unlike previous surveys on employment and
unemployment situation) and educational attainment. Table 4 presents two measures of adult

education for various groups: (i) fraction with high school or higher education, and (ii) average
years of education.9 For both indicators, Other Hindus are at the top (followed by Christians and
Other religious minorities), whereas lower caste Muslims are at the bottom. The difference
between the top and bottom groups is considerable: about 33 percentage points (educational
attainment) and about four and half years of education. Upper caste Muslims fare marginally
better than Dalits and considerably worse (by about 9 percentage points in educational
attainment and about 1.3 years of education) than OBCs.10
Insert table 4 here
The above analysis can be broadly summarized as follows: (i) Upper caste Hindus,
Christians and Other religious groups are at the top of the hierarchy in terms of both monetary
and non-monetary indicators, (ii) Dalits and lower caste Muslims are at the bottom, and (iii) the
relative status of Muslims is better in rural areas, as compared to the same in urban areas.11
While we obtain a picture of national and larger spaces/aggregations from this section, we still
lack an intra-city understanding. The next section presents this.
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We consider an age threshold of 23 years since by this age, most people would have completed their

education. Other reasonable thresholds yield similar results.
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Religious groups fare differently in terms of their income, consumption or wealth, partly due to

education. In particular, other minorities (like Christians and Parsis) perform relatively better due to their
higher education.
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Explaining the rural-urban differences is beyond the scope of the paper, but two reasons are that

Muslims do possess land in rural areas and are subject less to communal violence (which historically has
been an urban phenomenon) and discrimination.

4. Religion, Space and their Interconnections in Hyderabad and Mumbai
In this section, we analyze the interaction between space and religion in Hyderabad and
Mumbai and discuss similarities and differences between these cities. Based on history (Alam
1973; Mehrotra and Dwivedi 1995; Dossal 2010), we divide Hyderabad and Mumbai into zones
and compare composition and status of religious groups in these zones. We then identify areas
that contain ghettos and enclaves. We consider a spatial unit to contain a ghetto if its residents
are highly overrepresented among the city’s poor: bottom quartile (poorest 25%) of incomes. To
categorize enclaves, we focus on the city’s rich, again taking a relative perspective: top 5% of the
income distribution. If a spatial unit is highly overrepresented among the top 5%, then we argue
that it contains an enclave. Residents of a spatial unit are overrepresented among the poor/rich if
their contribution to the city’s poor/rich is higher than their contribution to the city’s population.
How much should overrepresentation be in order to classify it as high? We choose a threshold
factor of 1.5 e.g., if a spatial unit contains 10% of the city’s population and 20% of the city’s
poor/rich; its residents are highly overrepresented (20/10=2>1.5) among the poor/rich.12
4.1. Status of Religious Groups, Ghettos and Enclaves in Hyderabad
We divide Hyderabad into four zones, as shown in figure 1.13 Old-Walled city (as the
name suggests) is the oldest part, where a physical wall was built to protect the center/core of the
city (similar to other Indian ‘walled cities’). Hyderabad originated in this area in the 16th century
under the aegis of the Qutub Shahi dynasty. The zone that we refer to as ‘Nizam’s city’
developed later, during 18th-19th centuries, under the rule of Nizam (who declared independence

12

We tried other reasonable thresholds and our conclusions are broadly retained.
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The division into such zones is consistent with the literature on ‘cities of’ or ‘cities within’ in India e.g.,

Cities of Delhi (https://www.cprindia.org/projects/cities-delhi).

from Mughal rule). Hyderabad was the capital of the Nizam kingdom, the largest princely state
during the colonial period. As in other princely states, a British administrative representative was
resident in the city, in the area that we christen as ‘British Resident city’. Earlier industrialization
was undertaken in the second (Nizam’s city) and third (British Resident city) zones. The fourth
zone, ‘Neoliberal city’, also witnessed industrialization earlier, but is marked by industries in
newer sectors (e.g., Information Technology, Pharma and Finance).
Insert figure 1 here
Table 5 presents the religious composition of these zones. The first noteworthy
observation is that religious profiles vary within the city i.e., across zones. Muslims have their
highest and lowest shares in Old-Walled city (about 63%) and Neoliberal city (about 25%),
respectively. Other minorities show the opposite pattern. To identify ghettos and enclaves, we
need an appropriate spatial unit: neither too large nor too small and familiar in the city’s context.
We use subdistricts, which are recognizable areas. Although subdistricts are large, given our
survey-based/non-ethnographic analysis, our objective is not to pinpoint a ghetto/enclave, but to
locate it in a geographical unit. Table 6 presents population shares and shares among the poor
and rich. Figure 2 shows areas where ghettos and enclaves have been identified. Ghettos are
present in Bahadurpura, Bandlaguda and Charminar (see column (4)), which are all in OldWalled city and contain a high share of Muslims (e.g., Charminar: 91.3%). Other groups also
reside in these subdistricts, so what we are articulating is a presence of Muslim ghettos in them.
Educational levels are low here, particularly compared to the city average. The percentage of
adults who have completed high school or higher levels is about: 22% (Bahadurpura), 22%
(Bandlaguda), 18% (Charminar) and 34% (city). From column (5), rich enclaves are present in
Ameerpet, Amberpet, Himayath Nagar, Khairatabad and Saidabad. All these enclaves have a

sizeable proportion of rich Hindus, whereas a high proportion of rich Muslims (1.72%) can be
noted in Khairatabad. Given their small share in the population of Hyderabad, high shares of rich
belonging to other minorities can be found in Ameerpet (1.72%) and Khairatabad (2.58%).
Insert table 5, table 6 and figure 2 here
4.2 Status of Religious Groups, Ghettos and Enclaves in Mumbai
Mumbai city had its origins in its southern part (in Mumbai district today) during the
colonial period and was the capital of Bombay Presidency.14 Several factors (e.g., population
pressure, state policies) resulted in the spread of the city towards the north and into the suburbs
(in Mumbai Suburban district today). We divide the city into five zones, which are depicted in
figure 3. British and Neoliberal city roughly corresponds to what people refer to as ‘South
Bombay’ or ‘South Mumbai’. This zone has always had a substantial corporate and business
presence. Old Industrial city I and Old Industrial city II (as the names indicate) were the sites of
older industrialization, including textile mills. Western and Northern Neoliberal city are in the
suburbs and arose and grew in more recent times through the settling of people and the
emergence of infrastructure (e.g., airport, railway stations, highways), government services (e.g.,
courts, schools) and private establishments (e.g., hospitals, malls) to cater to their needs. An
important development has been the emergence of Bandra Kurla Complex (BKC), which has
resulted in a substantial and increasing corporate presence in the Western neoliberal zone. BKC
is a mixed (residential and work/office) space that has been developed by Mumbai Metropolitan
Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) as an alternative to South Mumbai. In the past two
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decades, the diamond bourse, several financial institutions (e.g., ICICI), consulates (e.g., UK)
and other private establishments (e.g., Amazon) have located themselves in BKC.15
Insert figure 3 here
Table 7 presents religious composition for these zones. As in Hyderabad, zones vary in
their religious profiles. Muslims have their highest share in British Neoliberal city (39.9%) and
their lowest share in the Northern neoliberal zone (10.2%). To characterize ghettos and enclaves,
we use municipal wards, which are recognizable, as the spatial unit. These ghettos and enclaves
are depicted in figure 4. Ghettos exist in the following municipal wards (see column (4), table 8):
C, M-East and P-South.16 The percentages of Muslims in these wards are high (e.g., 88.24% (C))
and we refer to these as Muslim ghettos. As expected, the educational levels are relatively low in
these areas. The percentages of adults, who have completed high school or higher education are
about: 33% (C), 34% (M-East) and 31% (P-South) and 45% (city). We refer to R-North
(covering Dahisar West) as a Dalit ghetto, given its high share of Dalits. Enclaves are present
(see column (5), table 8) in A, F-South, G-South, H-West, R-Central and T wards.17
Insert table 7, table 8 and figure 4 here
4.3. Comparisons between Hyderabad and Mumbai
Compared to Hyderabad, Mumbai has a much lower share of Muslims (about 20% vs.
44%) and higher share of other minorities (about 7% vs. 4.8%). There are other interesting
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Some well-known poor neighborhoods are: Bhendi Bazaar (C) and Shivaji Nagar (M-East). P-South

covers Goregaon West.
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Examples of upscale areas are: Colaba (A), Worli (G-South) and Bandra West (H-West). F-South, R-

Central and T wards cover the areas of Parel, Borivali West and Mulund West, respectively.

differences, both spatial and non-spatial. In Hyderabad, the zone with highest proportion of
Muslims (Old-Walled city) also has the lowest share of other minorities. On the contrary, in
Mumbai, the British Neoliberal Zone is the highest for both Muslims and other minorities. From
figures 3 and 4, we can observe a spatial separation between Muslim ghettos and elite enclaves
in Hyderabad, but not so in Mumbai (British Neoliberal zone contains both a ghetto and an
enclave). Of course, subdistricts in Hyderabad and municipal wards in Mumbai are large, so this
separation is not “clean” i.e., poor individuals (including poor Muslims) reside in the vicinity of
enclaves in both cities. However, this pattern does say something about differences in spatial
segregation between the two cities. The higher segregation of Hyderabad is also supported by
quantitative measures: Duncan and Duncan dissimilarity indices for Hindu-Muslim segregation
for Hyderabad and Mumbai are 0.67 and 0.52, respectively.18 Other differences between the
condition of Muslims in Hyderabad and Mumbai are worth noting. A much larger proportion of
Muslims live outside areas where we identified ghettos in Mumbai (about 90%), as compared to
Hyderabad (roughly 50%). These differences may have to do with specific histories of Muslim
communities (e.g., the flight of Muslim elites from Hyderabad after independence) and
differential impacts of communal violence (e.g., Contractor (2012); Rao and Thaha (2012)).
There are important similarities between the cities. In both cities, Muslims are
underrepresented among the rich and overrepresented among the poor (the extent being much
higher in Hyderabad).19 Some areas become marked as ‘Muslim-dominated’ or ‘Muslim slums’,
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These indices are calculated by treating Census wards as spatial units within the city. Susewind (2017)

arrives at comparable estimates using electoral data.
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In Hyderabad, the share of Muslims among the population and the poor are: 44.2% and 65.3%,

respectively. The corresponding figures for Mumbai are: 20.3% and 29.0%.

and once this branding occurs, it influences social relations within these areas and relations with
other parts of the city (an instance of space and social relations mutually constituting/reinforcing
each other).
4.4. Impact of Spatial Integration
Having characterized ghettos and enclaves, we ask whether integration has any real
effects by examining whether households living in more integrated neighborhoods have better
development outcomes. We focus on income-poverty, probably the simplest and most widely
used measure to assess development. However, we immediately confront the problem that India
has not arrived at an official poverty line after the controversies that emerged during the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) administration (Subramanian 2013; Motiram and Vakulabharanam
2015). So, we use a standard relative poverty line: half the median per-capita income of the city.
Whether a household is poor or not, depends on its characteristics (e.g., class) and the
characteristics of the neighborhood that it lives in. For example, if a household belongs to the
informal sector, it is more likely to be poor. We hypothesize that if a household lives in a
neighborhood that is more integrated, then it is less likely to be poor. There are several reasons
why this could be true. First, in developing countries, informal and formal sectors feed on each
other (Sanyal 2007). While the former subsidizes the latter (through cheap labor), the latter
provides employment opportunities. Such ‘dependent informality’ could be stronger in more
integrated neighborhoods. Second, more integrated neighborhoods could engender a higher level
of consciousness that translates into collective action. Finally, more integrated neighborhoods
could facilitate the provision of superior public goods. These mechanisms lead to lower poverty.
How can we measure spatial integration? Previously, we have argued that this can be
done better by conceptualizing it as a combination of integration in terms of: income groups and

identity groups (including classes) and termed this as ‘grayness’. Since more than two groups
could co-exist in a city, we use the inverse of the Gini index of segregation to capture the second
component.20 This component is defined as:
$
%#
! %!

𝐺𝐶 = 1 − [

&
" )
# $
∑*
!'( "! ∑#'( ∑$'( # # $ %" %%" $
!

"
"
& ∑*
!'( "! '(%"! )

!

]

(1)

N (≥ 2) and G (≥ 2) are the number of spatial units and identity groups in the city, respectively.
𝑝*+ (0 < 𝑝*+ < 1) and 𝑝*, (0 < 𝑝*, < 1) are the shares of the population belonging to group g (=
1,2, … , 𝐺) that live in the city and in the spatial unit m (= 1,2, … , 𝑁), respectively. 𝑠 - (0 < 𝑠 - <
1) denotes the share of the population living in spatial unit n (= 1,2, … , 𝑁).
Given that our outcome of interest (poverty) itself depends on income, we use this
component (GC) as the measure of integration in the regression below. We consider two groups:
Hindus and Non-Hindus. This would broadly amount to examining Hindus and Muslims
(particularly in Hyderabad, where Muslims are by far the dominant minority group), thereby
capturing the main communal cleavage in India, while incorporating all minorities.21 The extent
of spatial integration in a neighborhood could be endogenous, so we need an instrument. From
the literature on industrialization in Hyderabad and Mumbai (e.g., Alam 1973; Adarkar 2012),
we can infer that early/older forms of industrialization brought together people from different
communities and various parts of the country. In other words, older/earlier industrialization was
positively correlated with integration. This is an underappreciated virtue of the strategy
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Gini allows more than two groups, unlike some other measures e.g., Duncan-Duncan dissimilarity
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Since the share of non-Muslim minority groups is quite small in several spatial units in both cities,

considering more than two groups would not be insightful.

envisaged by early planners and Indian nationalists (like Nehru). Industrial location was dictated
by considerations like availability of land and geographical characteristics, ensuring exogeneity.
Therefore, we use the following instrument: 1 (older industrialization) and 0 (otherwise),
considering subdistricts in Hyderabad and municipal wards in Mumbai as spatial units (grouping
smaller units together).
The model that we estimate is as follows:
𝑃. = 𝛼( + 𝛽( 𝑋. + 𝛾( 𝐺𝐶. + 𝑢.

(2)

𝐺𝐶. = 𝛼& + 𝛽& 𝑋. + 𝛾& 𝑍. + 𝑣. (3)
i indexes the household. Pi: 1 if i is poor and 0 if not. Xi: vector of i’s characteristics. GCi:
grayness of i’s neighborhood (subdistrict in Hyderabad and Municipal ward in Mumbai). Zi:
instrument described above. ui, vi: error terms. Table 9 presents results of an instrumentalvariable probit estimation. The instrument has the expected (positive) sign, is statistically
significant, and passes the test of validity. As we hypothesized, in both cities, the coefficients of
integration/grayness have the expected (negative) sign and are statistically significant:
households living in more integrated neighborhoods are less likely to be poor.22 The magnitudes
are also large. Compare two non-elite (class dummy=0) households, A and B, living in
neighborhoods with least and average (median) grayness, respectively.23 A is less likely to be
poor by about 18 (59) percentage points in Hyderabad (Mumbai).
Insert table 9 here
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We conducted several robustness checks e.g., using Duncan-Duncan dissimilarity index instead of Gini

and including other controls. Our main results go through. In the interests of space, we do not report these
here.
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We can also examine marginal effects, which reveal a similar picture.

5. Discussion and Conclusions
In the discussion above, we have used secondary databases and a spatially representative
household survey to document the relative status of various religious groups in urban India and
in Hyderabad and Mumbai. Broadly speaking, we find that Dalits and Muslims occupy the
bottom rungs of the urban economy. We identify ghettos and elite enclaves in Hyderabad and
Mumbai and show that Muslims are underrepresented in enclaves. We also identify differences
between Hyderabad and Mumbai e.g., Muslims are ghettoized to a greater extent in Hyderabad.
The findings from Hyderabad suggest that Muslims in cities with high Muslim concentration, do
not necessarily perform (relatively) well.24 This should be cross-checked for other similar cities
to see if over time, non-Muslim communities have taken over activities and spaces of economic
dynamism. We can identify some mechanisms (from secondary literature and our experiences)
through which ghettos and enclaves get established and reproduced. One is state policy e.g., MEast ward (Mumbai), where Muslims were settled (Contractor 2012). Another is communalism,
sometimes with active involvement of the state. Repeated incidents of communal violence have
forced communities to find security in numbers and come together in safe-spaces.25 A third
mechanism is market-discrimination e.g., real estate, banking and transport. Media reports (e.g.,
Koppikar 2015) have highlighted discrimination against Muslims in the housing market in
Mumbai. In Hyderabad, Muslims living in areas with a high proportion of Muslims have found it

24

Susewind’s (2015) analysis of Lucknow is consistent with this finding.

25

Active involvement in fomenting communal violence and/or negligence of the state has been

highlighted by media reports and independent investigations e.g., Justice Sri Krishna commission, 199293 Bombay riots. Sachar committee and the references on Hyderabad and Mumbai that we cited above
highlight safety concerns.

harder to participate in credit markets, even when they possess required documentation and are
‘credit-worthy’ (Rao and Thaha 2012). Transport infrastructure serving areas with high
proportion of Muslims is relatively inferior. This includes private transport, which often operates
through pre-conceived notions of safety.26 Finally, there is also ‘self-segregation’ (the desire to
stay with similar individuals), a detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper. This
may be more relevant for upper-class/relatively better-off Muslims.27
Ghettos and enclaves are eyesores, blots on the landscape that continuously remind us of
harsh realities and stark inequalities that characterize urban India. But, we show that they are
much more: residents of less-mixed/more-segregated neighborhoods are more likely to be poor.
At a theoretical level, our analysis highlights the importance of space and the need to understand
its interaction with other cleavages like class, caste and religion. It also suggests that we need
more analyses of cities, both intensive and comparative.
Scholars (e.g., Varshney 2002) have found the answer to why some Indian cities have
persistent communal riots whereas others do not in inter-communal (‘civic’) ties or
organizations. Our finding on the benefits of spatial integration is consistent with this. Such ties
would be stronger in more integrated neighborhoods and could contribute to better economic
outcomes as well as harmony. Our analysis has several policy implications. Pro-active and
effective policy may be needed in Indian cities to prevent discrimination based on religion in
credit and housing markets. During the last two to three decades, Indian cities have witnessed the

26

See Contractor (2012). Our real-estate and private transport (auto-rickshaws/taxis) experiences support

these observations.
27

See Galonnier (2015) on Aligarh and Susewind (2015) on social networks and waqf properties in

Lucknow.

entrenchment of spatial inequalities through elite enclaves (like gated communities), slums and
ghettos. Both state and civil society (Harriss 2000) have played a role in this phenomenon. This
trend should be arrested, and if possible, reversed. An important step in this direction would be
to reduce encroachment of urban commons and making them more accessible to the poor (many
of whom are Dalits or Muslims). Given our findings on the benefits of spatial integration, doing
so is not only equitable, but would also reduce poverty.
There is of course the question of political will. Our analysis was based on data that
pertains to the first term of the present NDA government and the UPA government that preceded
it. The second NDA term has seen more serious attacks on religious tolerance and the Indian
constitution. If things continue in the present manner, the adverse findings that we have
documented would only get worse.

References
Adarkar, N. (2012) The Chawls of Mumbai: Galleries of Life. Mumbai: Imprint One.
Alam, M. (1973) Metropolitan Hyderabad: A Strategy for Development. Mumbai: Asia Publishing
House.

Contractor, Q. (2012) “‘Unwanted in my city’ – the making of a ‘Muslim slum’ in Mumbai,” in:
Gayer, L. and Jaffrelot, C. (eds.) Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalization. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Dossal, M. (2010) Mumbai, Theatre of Conflict, City of Hope: 1660 to Present Times. New Delhi:
Oxford University Press.
Dwivedi, S. and Mehrotra, R. (1995) Bombay: The Cities Within. Bombay: Eminence Designs.
Galonnier, J. (2015) “The Enclave, The Citadel and the Ghetto: The Threefold Segregation of UpperClass Muslims in India,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 39(1), pp. 92-111.

Gayer, L. and Jaffrelot, C. (2011) Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalization.
New York: Columbia University Press.
GOI (2006) Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India – A
Report, Government of India, November 2006.
Harriss J (2006) “Middle-Class Activism and the Politics of the Informal Working Class,”
Critical Asian Studies 38(4): 445-65.
Jayadev, A., Motiram, S., and Vakulabharanam, V. (2007) “Patterns of Wealth Disparities in
India During the Era of Liberalization,” Economic and Political Weekly, 42 (39), pp. 3853-63.
Koppikar, S. (2015) “How bias against Muslim flat seekers came to be entrenched in India's
most cosmopolitan city,” Scroll, May 28.
Mehta, P.B. (2020) “In post-mortem of secularism, we are hand wringing over religion, missing
the real crisis,” Indian Express, August 11, 2020.

Motiram, S. and Vakulabharanam, V. (2015) “Towards Understanding Poverty in India,”
in: Akundy, A. and Mishra, R.K. (eds.) The Indian Social Sector: Trends and Issues. New Delhi:
Academic Foundation, pp. 41-57.
Nagaraj, R. (2013) “Understanding the Boom and Its Aftermath India's Dream Run, 2003-08,”
Economic and Political Weekly, 48(20), pp. 39-51.
Nagaraj, R. (2020) “Understanding India’s Economic Slowdown Need for a Concerted Action,”
I.G. Patel Memorial Lecture, Anand, January 2, 2020.
Peach, C. (2009) “Slippery Segregation: Discovering or Manufacturing Ghettos?,” Journal of
Ethnic Migration Studies, 35(9), pp. 1381-1395.
Poovanna, S. (2020) “CAA is a result of hatred, says historian Ramchandra Guha,” Mint,
February 7, 2020.
Rao, N.A. and Thaha, A. (2012) “Muslims in Hyderabad-Landlocked in the Walled City,” in:
Gayer, L. and Jaffrelot, C. (eds.) Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalization. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Sanyal K (2009) Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation,
Governmentality and Post-Colonial Capitalism. New Delhi: Routledge.
Sen, A.K. (1999) Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stewart, F. (2002) “Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development,” Annual
Lecture 5, UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, March 2002.

Subramanian, S. (2014) “The Poverty Line: Getting it Wrong Again… and Again.”
Economic and Political Weekly 49(47): 66-70.
Susewind, R. (2015) “Spatial Segregation, Real Estate Markets and The Political Economy
of Corruption in Lucknow, India,” Journal of South Asian Development, 10(3), pp. 267291.
Susewind, R. (2017) “Muslims in Indian cities: Degrees of segregation and the elusive
ghetto,” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 49 (6), pp. 1286-1307.
Vakulabharanam, V. and Motiram, S. (2012) “Understanding Poverty and Inequality in Urban
India Since Reforms: Bringing quantitative and qualitative approaches together,” Economic and
Political Weekly, 47(47-48): 44-52.
Vakulabharanam, V. and Motiram, S. (2019) “Role of Urban Inequality in the Phenomenon of
Rising Wealth Inequality in India, 2002-2012,” in: Haque T and Reddy DN (eds.) India Social
Development Report 2018. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 50-57.

Varshney, A. (2002) Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, New Haven:
Yale University Press.

Tables and Figures
Table 1: Average Earnings (Rupees) in India, 2018-19
Share
(%)
Rural
Dalit
OBC
Other Hindu
Hindu (Total)
Muslim (Lower Caste)
Muslim (Others)
Muslim (Total)
Christians
Others
Total
Urban
Dalit
OBC
Other Hindu
Hindu (Total)
Muslim (Lower Caste)
Muslim (Others)
Muslim (Total)
Christians
Others
Total

Regular
Salaried
Male

Female

Self
Employed
Male
Female

30.35
37.16
15.96
83.47
6.70
4.60
11.30
1.57
2.08

13024.78 6935.18
12798.58 8916.67
15355.57 11142.91
13526.01 8762.91
12012.47 9274.07
13968.28 7351.88
12999.15 8294.85
15995.77 9482.11
13746.15 7689.44
13553.84 8729.96

8045.17
9296.78
10615.55
9245.25
9811.80
9804.72
9808.66
8925.08
13974.55
9415.82

4000.52
4305.22
4746.31
4293.84
3289.54
3451.70
3349.07
5285.46
4751.46
4227.62

14.93
32.23
29.45
76.61
9.47
7.70
17.17
3.05
3.17

16328.22
18683.85
22070.86
19718.93
13811.46
16983.48
15347.83
22295.12
19698.41
19208.14

13254.87
15046.75
20745.06
17096.73
13187.91
14935.37
14007.17
17931.32
22273.49
16741.02

5435.49
5993.06
9002.50
6976.71
4645.09
4610.22
4627.19
8711.06
9088.33
6616.83

11371.34
13016.65
18643.10
14915.52
12054.76
12996.74
12519.96
19294.33
15510.75
14848.69

Source: Authors’ computations from unit-level data of Periodic Labor Force Survey.
Note: 1. For both males and females and for both types of workers, averages are over four.
quarters.
2. For urban areas, Totals include observations that are in the repeat visits file, but are missing in
the household file i.e., individuals living in households for which religion/caste data is missing.

Table 2: Average Consumption Expenditure (Rupees) in India

Dalit
OBC
Other Hindu
Hindu (Total)
Muslim (Lower Caste)
Muslim (Others)
Muslim (Total)
Christians
Others
Total

PLFS
68th
Rural
Urban
Rural
6764.97 10640.38 1054.74
7586.18 12026.21 1276.39
8886.61 16303.14 1583.90
7536.23 13400.48 1257.56
8001.97 10986.29 1244.31
7678.12 11837.33 1160.00
7870.16 11368.02 1205.37
8669.48 13809.97 1827.83
10314.27 16921.62 1933.21
7682.39 13175.86 1278.94

Round
Urban
Million-Plus Metros
1823.13
2056.81 1979.94
2145.32
2443.79 2559.94
3245.34
3673.15 4301.68
2504.39
3031.85 3516.76
1599.65
1409.41 1874.19
1870.22
2198.16 1993.86
1728.15
1851.76 1958.34
2939.56
4088.99 3826.96
2915.24
3440.01 3907.22
2399.22
2873.78 3364.82

Source: Authors’ computations from unit-level data of Periodic Labor Force Survey (PLFS,
2018-19) and NSS 68th round, 2011-12.
Note: For 68th round, these are Uniform Recall Period (URP) estimates.

Table 3: Average Net-Worth (Rupees) in India, 2012-13

Dalit
OBC
Other Hindu
Hindu (Total)
Muslim (Lower Caste)
Muslim (Others)
Muslim (Total)
Christians
Others
Total

Rural
Urban
Million-Plus
Metros
100448.16 197289.63
216178.80
231171.80
215857.25 420090.83
530297.80
852165.50
360447.22 958324.64
1418811.00 2843397.00
202072.39 585885.40
891103.8 1856305.00
163198.76 192761.39
207762.50
452453.10
139073.72 277209.51
321067.40
344867.10
152146.43 229374.80
891103.80
368578.70
343362.90 777634.60
723126.30 1023265.00
751374.38 1120880.00
1076345.00 2254936.00
211117.54 545339.86
803765.80 1639195.00

Source: Authors’ computations from unit-level data of NSS All-India Debt and Investment
Survey, 2012-13.

Table 4: Education of Adults in Urban India, 2018-19

Dalit
OBC
Other Hindu
Hindu (Total)
Muslim (Lower Caste)
Muslim (Others)
Muslim (Total)
Christians
Others
Total

% High School Average Years
or higher
23.0%
6.98
32.8%
8.62
50.5%
10.86
38.3%
9.25
17.4%
6.37
23.9%
7.24
20.4%
6.78
42.4%
10.05
44.6%
10.05
36.0%
8.93

Source: Authors’ computations from unit-level data of Periodic Labor Force Survey.
Note: Estimates based on those 23 years or older.

Table 5: Zones and their Religious Composition, Hyderabad

Dalit
OBC
Other Hindu
Hindu (Total)
Muslim (Lower Caste)
Muslim (Others)
Muslim (Total)
Others
Total

Old-Walled Nizam's British
Neoliberal Total
City
City
Resident City City
8.57
9.88
17.13
12.09
11.26
18.65
30.1
39.21
27.12
27.26
5.94
19.85
13.65
21.9
12.57
33.16
59.83
69.99
61.11
51.09
9.18
17.27
21.88
8.17
14.31
54.2
17.91
4.07
16.99
29.85
63.38
35.18
25.95
25.16
44.16
3.47
4.99
4.07
13.73
4.75
100
100
100
100
100

Source: Authors’ computation from survey data.
Note: For the definition of these zones, see section 4.

Table 6: Ghettos and Enclaves in Hyderabad
Subdistrict

Shaikpet
Ameerpet
Secunderabad
Tirumalgiri
Maredpalle
Musheerabad
Amberpet
Himayath Nagar
Nampally
Khairatabad
Asifnagar
Golconda
Bahadurpura
Bandlaguda
Charminar
Saidabad
Total

%Pop %Poor %Rich
(1)
5.73
1.54
4.25
4.92
4.3
7.87
3.21
1.16
5.7
6.44
12.43
4.94
14.59
7.79
6.82
8.29
100

(2)
3.67
0
2.35
4.14
0.94
7.99
0.94
0.19
6.2
0.09
6.67
3.38
29.89
13.25
13.91
6.39
100

(3)
7.3
7.73
0
6.01
3.43
6.44
9.44
6.44
3.86
11.59
17.17
3.86
0
1.72
0
15.02
100

(2)/(1) (3)/(1) % High School
Or Higher
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.6
1.3
39.74%
0.0
5.0
77.55%
0.6
0.0
40.18%
0.8
1.2
22.90%
0.2
0.8
41.41%
1.0
0.8
30.11%
0.3
2.9
51.32%
0.2
5.6
67.65%
1.1
0.7
33.59%
0.0
1.8
50.00%
0.5
1.4
33.54%
0.7
0.8
31.40%
2.0
0.0
21.67%
1.7
0.2
21.93%
2.0
0.0
17.73%
0.8
1.8
40.83%
34.06%

Source: Authors’ computations from survey data.
Note: 1. Those in the bottom quartile (25%) of the income distribution are considered as poor.
2. Those in the top 5% of the income distribution are considered as rich.
3. For education, estimates are for those older than 23 years.

Table 7: Zones and their Religious Composition, Mumbai

Dalit
OBC
Other Hindu
Hindu (Total)
Muslim (Lower Caste)
Muslim (Others)
Muslim (Total)
Others
Total

British
Old Ind Western
Northern Old Ind
Neoliberal City I
Neoliberal Neoliberal City II
8.63
17.07
4.10
16.09
10.49
12.94
19.00
7.15
7.81
20.58
28.68
43.32
51.96
61.05
47.57
50.25
79.39
63.21
84.95
78.64
3.30
2.25
9.42
1.41
2.72
36.55
11.92
19.44
8.75
12.04
39.85
14.17
28.86
10.16
14.76
9.90
6.44
7.93
4.89
6.6
100
100
100
100
100

Source: Authors’ computation from survey data.
Note: For the definition of these zones, see section 4.

Total
11.02
11.76
50.05
72.83
4.39
15.94
20.33
6.84
100

Table 8: Ghettos and Enclaves in Mumbai
Municipal % Pop % Poor % Rich (2)/(1) (3)/(1) % High School
Ward
Or Higher
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
A
1.26
0
3.93
0.0
3.1
60.00%
B
1.47
0
1.12
0.0
0.8
62.96%
C
2.27
3.59
1.12
1.6
0.5
25.93%
D
2.89
2.95
2.25
1.0
0.8
73.21%
E
2.65
0
2.25
0.0
0.8
37.88%
F-North
3.34
2.18
1.69
0.7
0.5
28.95%
F-South
3.9
2.82
8.99
0.7
2.3
48.42%
G-North
4.63
5.13
5.06
1.1
1.1
33.66%
G-South
4.73
5.26
12.36
1.1
2.6
44.17%
H-East
6.58
3.34
9.55
0.5
1.5
45.70%
H-West
3.13
0
5.06
0.0
1.6
69.33%
K-East
6.55
8.6
2.81
1.3
0.4
35.95%
K-West
7.27
10.4
3.93
1.4
0.5
35.95%
L
7.14
5.39
2.25
0.8
0.3
47.89%
M-East
3.34
5.52
1.12
1.7
0.3
29.49%
M-West
3.77
3.08
1.12
0.8
0.3
31.82%
N
1.76
0.39
1.69
0.2
1.0
41.86%
P-North
7.75
9.5
8.43
1.2
1.1
47.16%
P-South
3.53
10.01
1.12
2.8
0.3
25.71%
R-Central
6.26
5.26
9.55
0.8
1.5
34.51%
R-North
3.8
5.91
4.49
1.6
1.2
43.42%
R-South
7.09
7.83
6.74
1.1
1.0
33.96%
S
2.99
1.67
0
0.6
0.0
34.25%
T
1.9
1.16
3.37
0.6
1.8
45.00%
Total
100
100
100
40.91%

Source: Authors’ computations from survey data.
Note: 1. Those in the bottom quartile (25%) of the income distribution are considered as poor.
2. Those in the top 5% of the income distribution are considered as rich.
3. For education, estimates are for those older than 23 years.

Table 9: Instrumental Variable Probit Analysis
(Dependent Variable: 1 if Household is poor and 0 if not)
Hyderabad

Mumbai

-2.550*
(0.473)
-0.952*
(0.200)
0.173
(0.228)
0.168*
(0.015)
7.11
(0.008)

-3.313*
(0.932)
-0.705
(0.309)
1.628**
(0.816)
0.034*
(0.014)
6.79
(0.009)

Grayness
Class Dummy
Constant
Instrument
Chi2
(Prob> Chi2)
Source: Authors’ computations from survey data.

Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. * and ** denote that the coefficient is statistically
significant at 99% and 95% confidence level, respectively.
2. Grayness is computed with household as the unit and with two groups: Hindus and Others.
The subdistrict or municipal ward is treated as the neighborhood and the census ward as the unit
within the neighborhood.
3. Class dummy: 1 if elite, professional or retired; 0 otherwise.

Figure 1: Zones in Hyderabad

Source: District Census Handbook, Census of India 2011. We overlaid the zones on the map.

Figure 2: Zones in Mumbai

Source: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. We overlaid the zones on the map.

Figure 3: Ghettos and Enclaves in Hyderabad

Note: Ghettos are represented by circles and enclaves by triangles.

Figure 4: Ghettos and Enclaves in Mumbai

Note: Ghettos are represented by circles and enclaves by triangles.

